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MINERAL RIGHTS
Patrick H. Martin *
The oil and gas industry continues to suffer from the difficulties
of the past several years. There are few signs of improvement. The
active rig count was 314 for the week of October 15, 1984, up from
268 one year earlier. The price of natural gas has not improved and
the price of oil continues to slip. Although recent sessions of the leg-
islature have changed the tax structure of the state, Louisiana remains
heavily dependent on the industry for revenue. Of great importance to
the state will be the deregulation, on January 1, 1985, of a considerable
portion of natural gas now being produced.
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In an active session of the Louisiana legislature, a number of acts
were passed affecting mineral rights in the State. Three will be noted
here for special attention.
Act 345 of 1984 amends Section 10 of Title 30 of the Revised
Statutes. With it, Louisiana joins several other states which have long
placed a risk charge on owners of operating interests who are unwilling
to commit funds to the drilling of a well on land included in a unit.
The risk charge is 100 percent of the tract's allocated share of the costs of
drilling, testing, and completing the unit well. The Act contains pro-
visions specifying how notice is to be given and election is to be made.
Another provision states that if
there is included in any unit created by the commissioner of
conservation one or more unleased interests for which the party
or parties entitled to market production therefrom have not
made arrangements to separately dispose of the share of such
production attributable to such tract, then the unity [sic] operator
shall pay to such party or parties such tract's pro rata share
of the proceeds of the sale of production within one hundred
eighty days of such sale.
Act 768 of 1984 amends Section 3(6) of Title 30 to redefine
"pool" for purposes of establishing units. It also amends Section 5(C)
to define more clearly the method for calculating the three-fourths in
interest of owners and of royalty ownership necessary to create a res-
ervoir-wide unit.
Act 559 of 1984 enacts Section 102 of Title 30 of the Revised
Statutes. It provides that within ninety days after the expiration of (1)
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production under a mineral lease previously maintained by production
and (2) all other rights maintaining the lease, the lessee or his assigns
must notify the lessor or his representative that the lease has terminated,
unless notification is already provided in the lease.
CONVEYANCE PROBLEMS; INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
Often in the oil and gas industry, parties will enter into "agreements
to agree." The extent to which such agreements are binding is a question
of considerable concern to attorneys advising clients on such transactions.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently had occasion to rule on
whether such a "preliminary" agreement could be given effect in Chevron
U.S.A. v. Martin Exploration Co.1
Chevron and Tomlinson were co-owners of a mineral lease. Tom-
linson entered into an agreement with BTA on November 18, 1975 for
BTA to drill a well on the leased property. The agreement stated that
Tomlinson and Chevron had reached a preliminary agreement for op-
erations on the lease, and provided for BTA to join the negotiations.
It further specified that the agreement provided for forfeiture of interest
for not joining in well costs. In July 1976, Tomlinson assigned part of
its interest to BTA, and in April 1977 Tomlinson assigned part of its
interest to Cotton. In July 1977, Chevron, BTA, Cotton, and Tomlinson
entered into an operating agreement for a well with a penalty of 350 percent
of well cost for nonconsenting parties. In May 1978, Tomlinson assigned
Martin a 7 percent interest in the same lease, subject to the November 18,
1975 Tomlinson/BTA agreement and the July 1977 Chevron/Tomlinson/
BTA/Cotton agreement. Martin paid its share of well costs for one well
under the July 1977 agreement, but did not join in operating agreements
or pay well costs for other wells drilled on the same lease. Chevron,
BTA, and Cotton brought suit, claiming that Martin lost its share of
the proceeds from these other wells by virtue of the November 15, 1975
agreement. Martin claimed that the forfeiture paragraph of that agree-
ment was only a preliminary agreement, and that as no final agreement
had been reached, it had no effect. The trial court held for the plaintiffs,
Chevron, BTA, and Cotton. Martin appealed. The court of appeal
reversed, 2 ruling that the paragraph of the 1975 agreement in question
was not binding as it was only preliminary. The plaintiffs appealed to
the supreme court. In reversing the court of appeal, the court held that
the "preliminary" agreement described in the Tomlinson BTA assign-
ment was not an agreement to agree, but was an actual contract between
Chevron and Tomlinson which was binding on Tomlinson's assignees,
including Martin, who received assignment with notice of the prior
agreement.
1. 447 So. 2d 469 (La. 1984).
2. Chevron U.S.A. v. Martin Exploration, 432 So. 2d 886 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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Another source of frequent confusion in the oil and gas business
is the use of terminology that lacks precise meaning. The use of the
term "royalty acre" is an example. This term is generally defined as
the royalty interest attributable to one acre of land, and is frequently
understood to refer to a one-eighth cost-free interest. The problem arises
from the fact that the actual royalty payable under a lease may be
greater than one-eighth. The use of such problematic terminology was
involved in a recent case from the third circuit, Thibodeaux v. American
Land & Exploration, Inc.3
Plaintiff, Thibodeaux, owned an undivided one-half interest in three
tracts of land. He executed a mineral lease covering the tracts to Stone
Oil in 1980, reserving a one-fifth royalty. In 1982, assuming that the
first lease had expired, he again leased the same interest in the three
tracts to Stone, again reserving a one-fifth royalty. Shortly thereafter
he sold one-half of the royalties he owned in the tracts to defendant,
stating that in no event should the royalties conveyed equal less than
11.8 "royalties acres." Two days later, plaintiff signed an agreement
with another company transferring one-half of his royalty interests in
the same three tracts for a much larger sum of money. The next day,
plaintiff filed suit to rescind the royalty deed to defendant. Plaintiff
claimed that he had intended to convey only one-fourth of his total
interest in the three tracts, asserting that the three tracts consisted of
29.5 acres which would yield 47.2 royalty acres (calculated at a one-
eighth royalty) when under lease at a one-fifth royalty rate: one-fourth
of 47.2 royalty acres would be 11.8 royalty acres. Plaintiff asserted that
defendant had defrauded him by the reference in the deed to one-half
of his royalties, or that there was an error of fact. Defendant asserted
that the agreement was clear, and that it was to receive one-half of the
one-fifth royalty on Thibodeaux's interest. The trial court found that
there was no fraud, but that plaintiff could not read and did not
understand the transfer provisions of the contract, and annulled the
royalty deed. Defendant appealed. The court of appeal reversed. The
court found no fraud. The plaintiff had dealt with "royalty acres" in
other transactions, and the trial court was clearly wrong in finding that
plaintiff misunderstood the terms of the royalty deed. Even if plaintiff
had misunderstood the terms of the royalty deed, he could not prevail
in a rescission action under the law of unilateral error.
A contract for the sale of royalty acres was also involved in Meeks
v. Romen Petroleum, Inc.4 Here, however, the claim was based on
failing to perform on a contract to purchase ten royalty acres. Plaintiff
was a landman who approached the defendant with a proposal to sell
defendant up to twenty acres of royalty in certain lands where a well
3. 450 So. 2d 990 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
4. 452 So. 2d 1191 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
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was being drilled; the landman would buy the royalty from the owners.
After negotiation, defendant agreed to purchase ten royalty acres at a
price of $11,000 per acre plus a six percent commission for plaintiff.
Plaintiff then purchased the royalty from the owners and made ar-
rangements for the transfer of the interest to defendant. When plaintiff
presented title to the defendant to complete the transaction, defendant
refused to pay the draft it had given to plaintiff, asserting that plaintiff
had failed to provide merchantable title and had failed to provide certain
technical data on the well. Plaintiff completed the transaction with the
royalty owners, and then sold the royalty to another for $7,000 per
acre. He then brought suit for breach of contract for $46,600, the
difference between the price agreed upon and the actual price of sale,
plus the broker's commission.
In defense to the claim, defendant asserted that plaintiff had simply
acted as his agent, and that he had failed to provide merchantable title.
Affirming the trial court, the court of appeal ruled that the acts did
not support a finding of an agency relationship. The appellate court
held that property has merchantable title when it can readily be sold
in the ordinary course of business by reasonable persons familiar with
the facts and questions involved.5 The facts established that the plaintiff
had met this requirement in a timely manner. In addition, the court
ruled that providing the technical data from the well on the land was
not a condition of the contract since it had not been proven to be part
of the contract; the court here applied the parole evidence rule as the
written agreement contained no such term.
Meadors v. Pacific International Petroleum, Inc. 6 presented a ques-
tion regarding the capacity of a lessor to enter into a lease. The lessor
brought suit to cancel a lease he had executed three years earlier. He
claimed that the lease had expired on its face, for the date of the lease
was typed as February 18, 1076, and that at the time of execution he
was under medication such that he was "temporarily deranged." The
trial court found for the plaintiff on the issue of capacity and ordered
cancellation of the lease. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the
plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving "quite convincingly and
by the great weight of the evidence" that he was mentally incompetent
at the time the lease was executed.7
Interpretation of the pricing provisions of a natural gas purchase
contract was before the court in the case of G/O Enterprises, Inc. v.
5. 452 So. 2d at 1193, quoting from Young v. Stevens, 252 La. 69, 209 So. 2d 25
(1967).
6. 449 So. 2d 26 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
7. 449 So. 2d at 28, quoting First Nat'l Bank of Shreveport v. Williams, 346 So.
2d 257, 264 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977). Under La. Civ. Code art. 1779, it is necessary that
the parties be legally capable of contracting. Article 1782 provides that in the absence of
a special exception, all persons are presumed to possess capacity to contract.
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Mid Louisiana Gas Co.8 Plaintiff, a producer of natural gas, entered
into a gas purchase contract in 1973 with defendant, a pipeline, for the
sale of gas which was subsequently found to be a sale in intrastate
commerce by the Federal Power Commission. In 1976, the gas well
began producing excessive salt water and had to be shut down. To
provide sufficient income to convert another well for the disposal of
the salt water, the parties amended the purchase contract on July 16,
1974 to increase the price for the gas. Although the transaction was
not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission, the
contract amendment provided for the maximum just and reasonable rate
permitted by the Commission for gas of the same quality and character,
and referenced Opinion No. 699-H of the Commission, issued in De-
cember 1974. The well was again brought into production. The prices
paid to the producer were based on the Opinion No. 699-H rate through
1978 even though the Federal Power Commission had issued Opinions
770 and 770-A in 1976, shortly after the contract amendment.
After the passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), 9
counsel for plaintiff made a demand for an increase in the price paid
for the gas to the highest price allowed by the NGPA, but the defendant
declined to change the price it had been paying. Plaintiff turned the
matter over to another attorney, who asserted that the payments should
have been increased to the Opinion 770 and 770-A levels after July
1976, and then to the NGPA level; on behalf of plaintiff he demanded
back payments. Suit was brought when the defendant refused to make
additional payments. The trial court held that the agreement was clear
and unambiguous and did not provide for continued escalations based
on new Commission opinions or on statutory changes. The court of
appeal affirmed. The language of the agreement was clear, it said, and
the interpretation of the agreement was confirmed by the conduct of
the parties. The plaintiff had made no demands for increases after the
Commission had issued Opinions 770 and 770-A.
There appears to be no reason to question the holding of the court
in GIO Enterprises, Inc. However, it is likely that this sort of problem
will recur in the future. Many gas purchase contracts have price pro-
visions which reference Commission regulations (either the Federal Power
Commission or its successor, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission)
or NGPA ceiling prices. On January 1, 1985, price controls are scheduled
to be removed from a substantial volume of natural gas currently flowing
under such contracts. Interpretation of these contracts will be a difficult
task. Despite the fact that much gas has been subject to federal reg-
ulation, the interpretation of the contracts is a matter of state law. 10
8. 444 So. 2d 1279 (La. App. 4th Cit. 1984).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
10. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
103 S. Ct. 697 (1983).
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LEASE MAINTENANCE-
Four cases worth noting were decided in the past year which relate
to lease maintenance and interpretation.
In Sun Exploration and Production Co. v. Rogers," a concursus
proceeding had been instituted to resolve the ownership of production
royalties under a lease covering some 235 acres. The lease in question
contained a provision known as an "entirety clause." While such pro-
visions are frequently found in leases in other states, Louisiana courts
have seldom had occasion to address the interpretation of such provi-
sions. This clause stated:
It is expressly understood and agreed that the premises leased
herein shall, for all the purposes of this lease, be considered
and treated as owned in indivision by the Lessor and shall be
developed and operated as one lease, and there shall be no
obligation on the part of Lessee to offset wells on separate tracts
into which the land covered by this lease may be now or hereafter
divided by sale, or otherwise, or to furnish separate measuring
or receiving tanks, and all rentals, royalties and other payments
accruing hereunder shall be treated as an entirety and shall be
divided among and paid to Lessor in the proportion that the
acreage (mineral rights) owned by each bears to the entire leased
acreage. Lessee may at any time or times pay or tender all
rentals or other sums accruing hereunder to the joint credit of
Lessor.2
The lease containing this provision had been executed in 1972
by Buckley, the common ancestor in title. His wife died in 1978 and
he died in 1980; the property burdened by the lease was divided under
his will. The will made no provision respecting a division of the mineral
rights. Eighty acres came to be owned by Wilburn and 155 acres by
Rogers. The producing well maintaining the lease was located on the
80 acre tract of Wilburn. He claimed to have the right to all of the
production royalty because that was the intention of the decedent, Buck-
ley. Rogers, the owner of the remaining acreage covered by the lease,
contended that the royalty should be apportioned as provided in the
lease. The trial court and the appellate court agreed with the position
of Rogers, holding that the royalty should be apportioned. Quoting from
the Williams and Meyers treatise on oil and gas law, Judge Marvin for
the second circuit court of appeal stated that an "entirety clause in a
lease will cause royalties to be apportioned despite subsequent subdi-
visions of the leased premises in the absence of contrary provision in
11. 451 So. 2d 587 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
12. Id. at 588 n.1.
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a conveyance subdividing the leased premises.'" 3 Since there was no
express provision to the contrary in a conveyance by the lessor, the
entirety clause required apportionment of royalty among each owner
who acquires a part of the leased property.
Sun Exploration is no doubt decided correctly. It should be noted,
however, that absent an entirety clause in a lease, the royalties would
not be apportioned under Louisiana law. That is to say, Louisiana has
adopted the "rule of nonapportionment" for the payment of royalty
under a lease over property which has been divided subsequent to the
creation of the lease. ' 4
Concerned about the force and effect of a lease under which they
were operating, several oil companies filed suit for a declaratory judg-
ment in 1980 seeking enforcement of the lease in General American Oil
Co. v. Meche.'5 The defendant lessors filed a reconventional demand
alleging that the effective date of the lease had been changed and then
recorded in 1977. They sought cancellation of the lease. The oil com-
panies argued that the lessors were asserting a tort claim more than
three years after the alleged tortious conduct, and that such actions were
limited by a one year prescriptive period. The lessors took the position
that their claim arose from a contract, and that a ten year prescriptive
period was therefore applicable; alternatively, they asserted that they
did not know of the alleged tortious actions until 1980 because of the
lessee's conduct. The trial court ruled that the one year prescriptive
period applied and dismissed the reconventional demand, finding also
that the lessors had reason to know of the alleged tortious conduct for
more than a year. The third circuit affirmed the trial court, adopting
the trial court's reasons for judgment as its own.
In Gorenflo v. Texaco, Inc., 6 plaintiffs, lessors of oil and gas rights,
sought to set aside their lease on several grounds. They asserted that
their lease had been pooled with an invalid lease, as the latter had been
signed and delivered by a tutrix on behalf of her children before the
court had approved it, and the judgment approving the lease by the
tutrix was not recorded. They also claimed that the lease had not been
maintained by unit operations because the lease provided only for a
declaration of a unit for production. The trial court ruled for defendants
on each of these points. 7 Plaintiffs appealed. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court.
It was the opinion of the Fifth Circuit that under Louisiana law,
the lease could be signed and delivered before court approval, but
13. Id. at 590, citing H. Williams and C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, § 521.3 (1975).
14. See French v. Querbes, 200 La. 654, 8 So. 2d 631 (1942).
15. 442 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
16. 735 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1984).
17. Gorenflo v. Texaco, 566 F. Supp. 722 (M.D. La. 1983).
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execution of the lease occurred only when all of the required formal
acts were accomplished. The public records doctrine 8 protects those who
rely on the public records in acquiring a real or personal right, privilege,
or permit; here plaintiffs in no way relied on the lack of recordation
of the court approval, and the fact that the lease itself was recorded
was enough to put plaintiffs on notice that an examination of the judicial
records was in order. The pooling clause in question allowed pooling
before or after production, and thus operations in the pooled area for
exploration before the end of the primary term were sufficient to main-
tain the lease.
Two reported cases decided in the past year involved the operation
of a lease provision known as the "Pugh Clause." Both were decided
in federal district court, and both were decided in favor of the lessees.
The first of these cases was Rougon v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. 9
Plaintiffs leased certain land to defendant, Chevron, for a primary term
of ten years, and for so long thereafter as oil or gas was produced,
with a Pugh Clause which divided the lease if a portion of the leased
premises were included in a unit. The Pugh Clause allowed the lessee
to maintain its lease of the acreage outside the unit by payment of
delay rentals for a period that could be as long as two years past the
end of the primary term. A portion of the land was included in a unit
created by the state, and the lessors brought suit to obtain cancellation
of the lease on the outside acreage. Their claim was that this lease
provision would allow the portion of the lease not within the unit to
continue for as long as twelve years without any operations. This result,
they contended, would violate Article 115 of the Louisiana Mineral
Code. 20 The defendant moved for dismissal on the ground that the Pugh
Clause provided for the effect of operations on the lease in question,
and on the lease (or on land unitized with the lease) there were in fact
operations within ten years. The district court granted summary judgment
for defendant and dismissed the claim. The court held that the lease
provision dividing the lease did not create a lease for a period longer
than ten years without operations, and thus did not violate Louisiana
public policy. Although the court's ruling is of limited authority as
precedent, it seems almost certainly correct.
The second Pugh Clause case was Morrison v. Conoco, Inc.2' Here
plaintiffs were lessors of 632 acres covered by the lease acquired by
defendants. In 1979, about seven acres of the lease were included in a
drilling and production unit from which production was commenced in
18. See La. R.S. 9:2721-22 (1965); Wells v. Joseph, 234 La. 780, 101 So. 2d 667
(1958).
19. 575 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. La. 1983).
20. La. Mineral Code: La. R.S. 31:115 (1975) [hereinafter cited as La. Min. Code].
21. 575 F. Supp. 876 (M.D. La. 1983).
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1981. The lease contained a Pugh Clause allowing maintenance of the
acreage outside the unit by drilling operations or by payment of delay
rental for a period of five years. The lease also contained a typed
provision requiring the lessee to make reasonable efforts to develop oil
and gas, and to drill offset wells as a reasonably prudent operator.
Lessees tendered delay rentals for the 624.6 acres outside the unit.
In November 1981, counsel for plaintiffs made demand on the
defendants for further development of the leased land. After defendants
declined to undertake further drilling, plaintiffs sought cancellation of
the portion of the lease outside the unit. Defendants moved for summary
judgment, which was granted by the court. It held that the typewritten
paragraph of the lease requiring the lessee to reasonably and adequately
develop the lease did not conflict with the printed paragraph authorizing
payment of Pugh Clause delay rentals for the portion of the lease not
in a unit. The typewritten paragraph did not increase the burden on
the lessee beyond that obligation already imposed on the lessee by
operation of the Louisiana Mineral Code. Payment of the delay rental
authorized by the Pugh Clause excused any additional drilling by the
lessee. As to a claim that defendants had failed to protect the lessors
against drainage, the court found that plaintiffs had failed to put the
lessee in default by a proper claim as required by the Mineral Code. 22
PARTITION
The mineral servitude doctrine of Louisiana mineral rights law is
quite complicated. The area of partition of mineral rights is particularly
difficult. This can be seen in Allied Chemical Corp. v. Dye,23 recently
decided by the second circuit court of appeal.
Allied, as lessee of certain mineral rights, initiated a concursus
proceeding to determine who owned interests in certain producing units.
The owners identified by the court as Group A contended that they
were owners of mineral rights under a mineral servitude created in 1971
by reservation of Dye in a conveyance of the land to the predecessor
in title of Group B. The Group B parties claimed that Dye's rights
were created in a 1967 partition that created an undivided mineral
servitude in which Dye was a co-owner, and thus when Dye conveyed
the property in 1971 it was subject to an outstanding mineral servitude.
As a result, they argued, Dye could not create a new mineral servitude
by his reservation of mineral rights. Since prescription of the mineral
rights created in 1967 had not been interrupted by 1977, they took the
position that the rights had expired, and, as landowners, they claimed
the right to all minerals produced which were attributable to their land.
22. La. Min. Code arts. 135-36 (Supp. 1984).
23. 441 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
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The trial court ruled in favor of the Group A claimants and the land-
owners appealed.
The second circuit affirmed the judgment of the trial court. In the
1967 partition of several non-contiguous, co-owned tracts, Dye, who
had owned 207/320ths of the land (and minerals), acquired full ownership
of the land in question, but it was provided that the partition would
not cover or affect minerals. The intent of the parties and the effect
of the transaction was to create *a 113/320ths servitude in the other
parties, and not an undivided servitude covering 100 percent of the minerals
co-owned with Dye. Thus, when Dye conveyed the land in 1971 he was
able to reserve the minerals not subject to the 113/320th servitude; a
new servitude was then created. This servitude was still in effect when
production occurred, and the Group B owners could not receive the
production attributable to the land covered by the servitude.
The Mineral Code clearly allows an owner of land to be a co-owner
of a mineral servitude burdening his property, contrary to the usual
rule of confusion of rights in Louisiana law. 24 However, whether a
landowner has in fact created a co-owned mineral servitude on his
property may be an issue of fact, as is illustrated by Allied Chemical.
The difficult problem with this case is that from the facts stated by
the court, there seem to be no words in the 1967 conveyance actually
creating a mineral servitude in the other parties. For additional guidance
in this area, one should review carefully two other cases on related
points, GMB Gas Corp. v. Cox, 25 and Wall v. Leger.26
The second partition suit to be noted is Steele v. Denning ' 7 also
decided by the second circuit. In this case, plaintiff landowner brought
suit for partition of land and mineral interests by licitation. Defendants
were the owners of a mineral servitude burdening plaintiff's interests in
the land, a mineral lessee, and other co-owners of the property whose
undivided interests were not subject to any mineral servitude. The trial
court found that the mineral lease had been conveyed by all co-owners
and was thus attributable to the entire property; therefore the lease was
not subject to partition. However, the trial court ordered a partition
by licitation of the other interests of the parties. Defendants appealed.
The appellate court reversed insofar as the judgment applied to the
defendant who owned the mineral servitude; it affirmed the trial court's
judgment as to the other defendants, subject to the exclusion of the
mineral servitude from any partition by licitation.
24. See La. Min. Code arts. 66-67 and the comments to these articles of the Mineral
Code.
25. 340 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); see also Cox v. Sanders, 421 So. 2d
869 (La. 1982).
26. 402 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) discussed in detail in Martin, Developments
in the Law, 1980-1981 -Mineral Rights, 42 La. L. Rev. 374, 383-84 (1982).
27. 445 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
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Although the Louisiana mineral servitude doctrine precludes the
creation of a "mineral estate" independent of full title to the land,
land subject to a mineral servitude may not be partitioned by licitation
with respect to the servitude because the landowners do not hold a
common element of ownership with the servitude owner. But partition
may be ordered with respect to other co-owners of land because all the
landowners have a common element of ownership in the property ex-
clusive of the right to search for minerals.
CONCURSUS PROCEEDINGS
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v..Lorio,28 the first circuit court of appeal
considered the issue of the right of a mineral lessee to contest liability
to claimants, and to seek a refund of money in a concursus proceeding.
The lessee, Chevron, had taken a lease from the Lorios for a one-eighth
royalty on a tract of land and had taken another lease on the same
land from the State of Louisiana for a one-sixth royalty. 29 After pro-
duction had commenced, Chevron invoked a concursus proceeding to
determine to whom it actually owed royalties, and reserved its rights to
seek a refund of the money it had deposited in court (at the higher
royalty rate payable under the state lease) if it were determined that
the Lorios were the proper claimants. The state and the Lorios com-
promised their differences and moved for summary judgment to dismiss
the proceedings. Chevron opposed the motion, seeking instead a deter-
mination of its rights and a refund. The trial court granted summary
judgment dismissing the proceedings, and Chevron appealed. The first
circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. It was the court's
opinion that under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure,3 ° a party
can invoke a concursus proceeding and still deny liability to a claimant.
The compromise between the state and the Lorios did not resolve all
issues of fact and law in the case.3 ' Thus, it was improper to grant
summary judgment.
PUBLIC RECORDS: MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
Florida Gas Exploration Co. v. Bank of St. Charles & Trust Co. 32
involved a collateral mortgage on certain property subject to a mineral
lease. Mason and Smith owned property in St. Charles Parish. In May
1974, they executed a collateral mortgage on the property in favor of
28. 442 So. 2d 1157 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
29. The Mineral Code specifically allows a lessee to "take leases from persons claiming
the leased land or mineral rights or interests therein adversely to his lessor." La. Min.
Code art. 121.
30. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4652.
31. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 966.
32. 435 So. 2d 535 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
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the Bank of St. Charles & Trust Company (the "Bank"). This mortgage
was recorded promptly, but contained an incomplete description of the
property because an exhibit referred to was not attached to the mortgage
as recorded. In November of the same year, Mason and Smith executed
a mineral lease on the same property; this lease was recorded on July
7, 1975. The same month, the Bank brought foreclosure proceedings
against the debtors, and the property was sold at public auction to the
Bank in September 1975. In March 1978 the Bank notified the lessees
that their lease had been terminated by the sale. They, in turn, filed a
declaratory action seeking to have a cloud on their title removed, and
their rights in the lease confirmed. They claimed that the property
description in the collateral mortgage was inadequate to put third parties
on notice.
The trial court held in favor of the lessees. The judgment was
affirmed by the court of appeal. Under the public records doctrine of
Louisiana33 third parties need look only to the public records to determine
the existence of adverse claims. Here the property description recorded
with the collateral mortgage was insufficient to put third parties on
notice of the adverse claim.
SERVITUDES: INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION
A second circuit case, Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. Kiene,3 4
decided an issue of interruption of prescription of a mineral servitude.
In 1968 the Graves sold land (110 acres) to Kiene, reserving a mineral
servitude for one-half of the minerals. In 1974, the Graves leased their
one-half to Durham, and Kiene leased his interest to Bradco. No drilling
took place on the servitude within the ten year period of liberative
prescription. But, in 1974 a well was spudded on a nearby tract. The
well was drilled under a permit to go to the Smackover Formation.
After the well reached 10,746 feet, another company took it over and
drilled to 11,520 feet. The Smackover sand was not productive. The
company tested other, shallower sands, including the McFearin Sand.
About forty acres of the servitude were included in a McFearin Sand
unit with the land on which this well was tested. The well was perforated,
acidized, and fractured in the McFearin Sand, but was unsuccessful and
was plugged and abandoned.
In 1979, another well was drilled which successfully produced from
the Cotton Valley Formation, and the same forty acres included in the
McFearin unit were included in the Cotton Valley unit. The operator
of the well filed a concursus proceeding to determine to whom to pay
the share of production attributable to the forty acres. Kiene, as land-
33. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3342 & 3347; La. R.S. 9:2721 (1965); McDuffie v.
Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
34. 437 So. 2d 940 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
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owner, claimed that the Graves' servitude had prescribed because of the
lack of production or good faith drilling operations in the years since
it had been created. The servitude owners contended that the efforts to
obtain production from the McFearin Sand were sufficient operations
in good faith to interrupt prescription as to the portion of the servitude
tract included in the McFearin unit. The trial court agreed with the
contentions of the servitude owners. On appeal the second circuit af-
firmed this opinion.
The court found that the operations to test the McFearin Sand had
been a good faith effort to secure production in paying quantities from
land with which a portion of the servitude had been unitized. Under
Article 33 of the Mineral Code35 such activity is sufficient to interrupt
prescription as to that portion of the servitude included in the unit. A
further issue was raised over the fact that the McFearin Sand location
had not been a legal location for completion of a well under the rules
of the Office of Conservation. Thus, said the landowner, the claim that
the operations in the McFearin Sand had been a good faith effort to
obtain production was a collateral attack on the orders of the Com-
missioner of Conservation. The court rejected this argument on the basis
that a representative of the Office of Conservation had testified that
exceptional locations can be and often are granted in circumstances such
as were presented by the facts of this case. In addition, two permits
had been obtained from the Office of Conservation specifically permitting
the testing done in the McFearin Sand.
CONSERVATION3 6
Two decisions on judicial review of orders of the Commissioner of
Conservation were rendered in the past year. Both involved a question
as to the time in which suit must be brought to challenge such orders.
In Corbello v. Sutton, 7 plaintiff sought judicial review of an order
of the Commissioner some seven months after the order was issued.
Applying the doctrine of laches as set forth by the first circuit in Jordan
v. Sutton, 38 the trial court dismissed the claim, and the court of appeal
affirmed.39 The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs and upheld the
dismissal of the claim, but held that the courts below had dismissed on
the wrong basis. The court declared that the equitable doctrine of laches
has no place in the law of Louisiana. The court thus rejected the rationale
35. La. Min. Code art. 33.
36. For the discussion under this heading, the author should point out to the reader
that he is not a disinterested observer. When the cases were argued or decided he was
serving as commissioner of conservation, and was in fact the party defendant in the
litigation.
37. 446 So. 2d 301 (La. 1984).
38. 401 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
39. Corbello v. Sutton, 442 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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of Jordan v. Sutton. Instead, the court held that a specific time limit
was found in the statutory provisions for judicial review, 40 and that the
claim had not been brought within the specified time period. While
correct, the decision is of limited effect with respect to conservation
matters as the statute had already been amended to remove any doubts
caused by the ruling in Jordan v. Sutton.
41
Despite the ruling in Corbello, the first circuit has decided still
another round in the litigation of Jordan v. Sutton.4 2 The suit challenged
an order of the Commissioner issued in 1979, and was originally brought
more than a year after the order was issued. In one appeal, the first
circuit ruled that although laches barred a challenge to the finality of
the order, plaintiff was not barred from seeking an order directing that
tests be performed on a well to determine its capacity to produce
hydrocarbons nor from seeking an order directing the Commissioner to
produce and allow the plaintiff to inspect certain information. 43 On
remand to the trial court, the judge dismissed plaintiff's suit. This was
error, the first circuit has now held. Although the trial judge was correct
in finding that mandamus would not lie because the Commissioner has
discretion to order a test of a well, the first circuit, ordered a testwell
but gave no explanation of its rationale.
40. The Court held that La. R.S. 30:15 provided a time limit for suits brought under
La. R.S. 30:12 (1975). The position adopted by the court was argued for in Martin,
Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Mineral Rights, 42 La. L. Rev. 374, 378-81 (1982).
41. 1983 La. Acts, No. 409, amending La. R.S. 30:12.
42. 450 So. 2d 1041 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
43. Jordan v. Sutton, 424 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
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